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ABSTRACT. This paper uses data from a Payments for Environmental Services (PES) project 
being implemented in Nicaragua to examine the extent to which poorer households that are 
eligible to participate are in fact able to do so, an issue over which there has been considerable 
concern. The study site provides a strong test of the ability of poorer households to participate as 
it requires participants to make substantial and complex land use changes. The results show that 
poorer households are in fact able to participate—indeed, by some measures they participated to 
a greater extent than better-off households. Moreover, their participation was not limited to the 
simpler, least expensive options. Extremely poor households had a somewhat greater difficulty in 
participating, but even in their case the difference is solely a relative one. Transaction costs may 
be greater obstacles to the participation of poorer households than household-specific constraints. 
 
SUMMARY. As the use of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) approaches in 
developing countries has grown, concern has arisen over the ability of poorer households to 
participate. This paper examines this concern with data from the Matiguás-Río Blanco area, 
where the Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project is using PES to 
encourage the adoption of silvopastoral practices in degraded pastures areas. The Silvopastoral 
Project offers a strong test of poor households’ ability to participate in PES, as many of the 
measures it supports are both expensive and technically challenging to implement. At the same 
time, however, the project also offers several easier and cheaper options. Should either 
investment requirements or technical capacity prove to be formidable obstacles for poorer 
households, there would be a clear division in the types of PES-supported activities they 
implement. The study area is characterized by high levels of poverty, with most households 
falling below the poverty line, and many below the extreme poverty line.  
The experience of the Silvopastoral Project in Matiguás-Río Blanco indicates that poorer 
households are able to participate in a PES program—indeed, by some measures they 
2  
participated to a greater extent than better-off households. Nor was their participation limited to 
the simpler, least expensive options: poorer households tended to implement more substantial 
changes in land use. Extremely poor households do appear to have had somewhat greater 
difficulty in participating, but even in their case the difference is solely a relative one. Extremely 
poor households not only were not shut out, but participated at high rates in the project. And 
again their participation was not limited solely to the simpler and cheaper practices. These results 
are particularly strong in that the Silvopastoral Project imposes much greater burdens on 
participants than most PES programs.  
Our results help us identify several specific factors that tend to affect participation, suggesting 
ways to design PES programs so as to reduce obstacles to participation by the poor. The 
availability of credit or other financing sources may well be important when, as in the 
Silvopastoral Project, participation in PES requires initial investments. The need for technical 
assistance is less clear from our results, though this may be due to the practices promoted by the 
PES program being already relatively well known in the area. The availability of multiple 
participation options can also help, as it allows households to choose the options that work best 
for them, in light of their particular constraints.  
In general, transaction costs are likely to be a bigger threat to the participation of poorer 
households in PES programs then their own ability to participate. Even if poorer households 
participate more intensively (in terms of share of their land converted), their contribution to the 
absolute increase in environmental service generation is often limited by the small size of their 
holdings. As transaction costs are largely per contract rather than per unit of environmental 
service provision, PES programs are likely to find it attractive to focus on large land holdings. 
Keeping transaction costs low—in addition to being desirable in itself—is thus imperative if 
poorer households are not be shut out of many PES programs.   
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1. Introduction 
Recent years have seen considerable interest in using Payments for Environmental 
Services (PES) to finance conservation in developing countries (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; 
Pagiola et al., 2002; Wunder, 2005; Pagiola and Platais, forthcoming). The PES approach is a 
market-based approach to conservation financing based on the twin principles that those who 
benefit from environmental services (such as users of clean water) should pay for them, and that 
those who contribute to generating these services should be compensated for providing them. 
The approach seeks to create mechanisms to arrange for transactions between service users and 
service providers that are in both parties’ interests, thus internalizing what would otherwise be an 
externality. The PES approach is attractive in that it (i) generates new financing, which would 
not otherwise be available for conservation; (ii) is likely to be sustainable, as it depends on the 
mutual self-interest of service users and providers and not on the whims of government or donor 
funding; (iii) is likely to be efficient, in that it conserves services whose benefits exceed the cost 
of providing them, and does not conserve services when the opposite is true.  
Latin America has been particularly receptive to the PES approach. PES programs are in 
operation in Colombia (Echevarría, 2002b), Costa Rica (Pagiola, 2005), Ecuador (Echevarría, 
2002a; Alban and Wunder, 2005), El Salvador (Díaz et al., 2002), Mexico (Muñoz et al., 2006), 
and others are under preparation or study in several countries. The World Bank is supporting the 
implementation of PES mechanisms in several countries, including Colombia, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, and South Africa, and helping prepare additional projects that use 
the approach in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Venezuela, and Kenya. 
As use of PES approaches grows, there is a need to understand how they affect the poor. 
Many have assumed that PES will contribute to poverty reduction by making payments to poor 
land users, while others have warned of potential dangers (Kerr, 2002; Landell-Mills and Porras, 
2002; Pagiola et al., 2002; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005). There has been little 
empirical verification to date, however. A recent review of the potential linkages between PES 
and poverty (Pagiola et al., 2005) raised three key questions: (1) Who are the actual and potential 
participants in PES programs, and how many of them are poor? (2) Are poorer households able 
to participate in PES programs? And (3) are poor households affected indirectly by PES 
programs?  
This paper uses data from a PES project being implemented in Nicaragua to examine the 
second of these questions: whether poorer households that are eligible to participate in a PES 
program are in fact able to do so. PES programs pay participating households ‘upon delivery’ of 
the desired environmental services (or rather, of land use that are expected to generate the 
service). The difficulty and cost of the required actions may well prevent poorer households from 
undertaking them.  
The Matiguás-Río Blanco area in Nicaragua provides an interesting setting to study the 
participation of poor households in a PES program. This area is one of the pilot sites for the 
Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project, which is using PES to 
encourage the adoption of silvopastoral practices in degraded pastures areas. This PES program 
offers a wide range of participation options, ranging from simple and inexpensive land use 
changes to substantial and complex changes (with correspondingly higher payments). We are 
thus able to go beyond examining binary participation/non-participation decisions and look at 
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intensity of participation. That some of the choices offered by the project are complex and 
onerous provides a particularly strong test of poorer households’ ability to participate. Moreover, 
the study area is characterized by high levels of poverty, with most households falling below the 
poverty line, and many below the extreme poverty line.1
We begin by discussing the factors that might hinder poorer households’ ability to 
participate in PES projects, drawing on the review by Pagiola et al. (2005) and on the rich 
literature on technology adoption by smallholders in developing countries, many of whose 
lessons are relevant to PES. We then describe the Silvopastoral Project and the Matiguás-Río 
Blanco area. We use data collected at the study site to analyze participation patterns, with 
particular attention to participation by poorer households. We first examine the extent to which 
different groups of households participate, and then undertake an econometric analysis to 
determine the factors that affect participation decisions. We then discuss the implications of our 
results for the design of PES programs. 
2. Constraints to the participation of poor households in PES programs 
PES programs pay land users to maintain or switch to land uses that provide 
environmental services that others value. Participation is voluntary, and participants receive 
payments for doing so. This creates a prima facie presumption that participants are at least no 
worse off by joining than they would be by not joining. Were this not the case, they could simply 
decline to participate. PES payments, in addition to covering opportunity costs, have the further 
advantage of being highly predictable. Unlike returns to crop production, which vary with 
weather and market conditions, payment amounts are fixed for the duration of the contract (as 
long as participants comply with its terms). PES programs have thus often proven highly 
attractive to land users. About three times more land is typically offered to Costa Rica’s and 
Mexico’s PES programs every year than available funding can cover (Pagiola, 2005; Muñoz et 
al., 2006). 
The potential impacts of PES programs will only be realized by those who participate. 
The literature on technology adoption and program participation provides many insights into the 
factors likely to affect participation (Feder et al., 1985). The literature on adoption of 
agroforestry practices (Pattanayak et al., 2003; Mercer, 2004) is particularly pertinent here, as 
the practices promoted by the Silvopastoral Project are very similar. Pagiola et al. (2005) group 
the factors that might affect a household’s decision to participate in a PES program into three 
categories: factors that affect eligibility to participate; factors that affect households’ desire to 
participate; and factors that affect their ability to participate. The three categories form a logical 
sequence (ability to participate only become an issue for households that wish to do so, and that 
in turn is only relevant for households that are eligible to participate). In this paper, we focus on 
examining the factors that affect the participation of eligible households, and particularly on how 
they affect the participation of poorer households.  
Eligibility to participate is affected by the program’s targeting and by requirements it 
may impose. Thus Costa Rica’s PES program requires applicants to be located in a priority 
                                                 
1  We focus here on participation by service providers. In some cases, there may be concern over the impact of 
PES programs on poor households that are service users (Pagiola et al., 2005). This concern does not arise in 
the project discussed here, however, as the benefits sought are global in nature and payments to participants are 
made with funding from the global community, as represented by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). 
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conservation area (based primarily on biodiversity criteria) or in a watershed covered by an 
agreement with an individual water user, and to meet a variety of requirements (such as not 
being in arrears with the country’s social security system). For a time, it required most 
participants to have land titles; this requirement has now been eliminated (Pagiola, 2005). 
Similarly, Mexico’s PES program defines eligible areas in terms of their importance to water 
supplies and other criteria (Muñoz et al., 2006).  
Some of these eligibility requirements may well affect the poor differentially. As most of 
Mexico’s remaining forests are in land owned by poor ejidos, the fact that Mexico’s PES 
program focuses on conserving existing forests means that many participants will be poor. More 
generally, geographic targeting has often been assumed to favor the poor, as most of the poor 
tend to be found in rural areas, and particularly in marginal areas such as the steep slopes of the 
upper watersheds (CGIAR, 1997; Heath and Binswanger, 1996). There have been few efforts to 
document this presumed spatial correlation between poverty and service provision, however, and 
these show mixed results. For example, Nelson and Chomitz (2002) find that watersheds in 
Guatemala and Honduras where substantial active deforestation is occurring on steep slopes tend 
to have the highest concentration of poverty. Conversely, Pagiola and Colom (2006) find very 
little correlation between poverty rates and the importance of an area for water service provision 
in Guatemala. Other eligibility requirements may also affect the poor differentially. Costa Rica’s 
requirement that applicants have land titles tended to shut out poorer land users while it was in 
force (Pagiola, 2005).  
The eligibility of poorer households will thus likely often be an important consideration. 
It is not an issue in our study, however, as we focus on an area that was selected for inclusion in 
the project. Moreover, as noted below, we only look at participants, who are by definition 
eligible.  
Assuming that a given household is eligible to participate, the next question is whether it 
desires to participate. This is likely to depend primarily on whether it expects to be better off as a 
result. Previous analyses confirm the significance of factors that tend to affect the benefits or the 
costs of participation, such as prices faced, farm characteristics, and the opportunity cost of 
household labor, the fit in the farming system, or the risk involved (Pattanayak et al., 2003). 
Factors such as slope, for example, can affect the extent to which productivity is threatened 
under current practices, thus increasing incentives to adopt land uses that are less vulnerable to 
degradation. As developing-country PES programs typically offer fixed payments per hectare for 
adopting a given practice, the payment itself is unlikely to differentially affect the desirability of 
participation across households.2  
A household may want to participate in a PES program and yet be unable to do so, for a 
variety of reasons. Participation in a PES program requires adoption of the land uses promoted 
by the program. This may be simple, if the program calls for retaining existing land uses (as in 
the Costa Rica program’s forest protection contract), or it may be complex, if the program calls 
for switching to new practices (as in the Silvopastoral Program studied here). Tenure issues are 
often critical, particularly in cases where PES programs require long-term investments, such as 
                                                 
2  A possible exception to this statement might result if differences in risk aversion and in the risk profile of the 
household’s other activities lead some household to value the certainty of PES payments more than others. 
Although there is a substantial literature on farm household behavior under risk, there has been no empirical 
studies to date of their perception of PES payments, to our knowledge. 
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reforestation or adoption of silvopastoral practices. Tenure variables were significant in 72% of 
agroforestry adoption studies that included them, with greater tenure security being consistently 
associated with greater adoption (Pattanayak et al., 2003). In Costa Rica, both Thacher et al. 
(1997) and Zbinden and Lee (2005) found tenure-related variables to be highly significant in 
explaining participation in the country’s PES program and its predecessors. Programs that 
require adoption of new practices may also face technical or financial constraints. When the new 
practices to be adopted are complex, access to technical assistance may be an issue. Access to 
extension was found to significantly affect agroforestry adoption in 90% of studies that included 
it (Pattanayak et al., 2003). This was the case in two studies in Costa Rica, for example (Thacher 
et al., 1997; Zbinden and Lee, 2005). Adopting new land use practices may also prove difficult if 
households cannot finance the necessary investment. Savings, remittances, or off-farm income 
may help some households undertake the necessary investments. Assets and credit both tend to 
increase adoption of agroforestry practices, and their role is very often significant (Pattanayak et 
al., 2003). 
Many of the factors that affect a household’s ability to participate in PES may well be 
more salient for poor households. Poorer households are less likely to have secure tenure, tend to 
have fewer savings and less access to credit, and are less likely to receive technical assistance (de 
Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000; López and Valdés, 2000). Whether poor households will be able to 
participate in PES programs (assuming that they are eligible and interested in doing so) is thus a 
legitimate source of concern. 
Worries that poorer households may not be able to participate in PES programs have been 
heightened by recent case studies in Costa Rica indicating that many participants in that 
country’s PES program are relatively well-off (Ortiz Malavasi et al., 2002; Miranda et al., 2003; 
Zbinden and Lee, 2005). In Mexico, better-off ejidos were over-represented in terms of their 
participation in that country’s PES program, while very highly marginalized ejidos were 
substantially under-represented (Muñoz et al., 2006).  
3. The Silvopastoral Project 
The Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project is piloting the use 
of PES in three areas: Quindío, in Colombia; Esparza, in Costa Rica; and Matiguás-Río Blanco, 
in Nicaragua (Pagiola et al., 2004). The project is financed by a US$4.5 million grant from the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF), though the World Bank. It is being implemented in the field 
by local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In Nicaragua, this work is being conducted by 
Nitlapan, an NGO affiliated with the Central American University.  
Silvopastoral practices, which combine trees with pasture, offer an alternative to 
prevalent cattle production systems. Cattle production has long been an important cause of the 
loss of natural habitat and biodiversity in Central America (Downing et al., 1992; Kaimowitz, 
1996). In addition to the environmental problems caused by the initial loss of forest, extensive 
grazing often suffers from loss of soil fertility and diminishing grass cover, resulting in soil 
erosion, contamination of water supplies, air pollution, and landscape degradation. Lower 
income for producers results in continuing poverty and can lead to pressure to clear additional 
areas.  
Silvopastoral practices include (1) planting high densities of trees and shrubs in pastures, 
thus providing shade and diet supplements while protecting the soil from packing and erosion; 
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(2) cut and carry systems, in which livestock is fed with the foliage of specifically planted trees 
and shrubs (‘fodder banks’) in areas previously used for other agricultural practices; and (3) 
using fast-growing trees and shrubs for fencing and wind screens. These practices provide deeply 
rooting, perennial vegetation which is persistently growing and has a dense but uneven canopy.  
The on-site benefits of silvopastoral practices to land users may include additional 
production from the tree component, such as fruit, fuelwood, fodder, or timber; maintaining or 
improving pasture productivity by increasing nutrient recycling; and diversification of 
production (Dagang and Nair, 2003). These benefits can be important, but are often insufficient 
by themselves to justify adopting silvopastoral practices—particularly practices with substantial 
tree components, which have high upfront planting costs and only bring benefits several years 
later. Estimates prepared for the project show rates of return of between 4% and 14% (Gobbi, 
2002). Other studies found similar results; White et al. (2001), for example, found rates of return 
to adoption of improved pasture in Esparza, Costa Rica, of 9% to 12%. These estimates, of 
course, only consider the on-site benefits of silvopastoral practices.  
Because of their increased complexity relative to traditional pastures, silvopastoral 
practices also have important biodiversity benefits (Dennis et al., 1996; Harvey and Haber, 
1999). They have been shown to play a major role in the survival of wildlife species by 
providing scarce resources and refuge; to have a higher propagation rate of native forest plants; 
and to provide shelter for wild birds. They can also help connect protected areas. Silvopastoral 
practices can also fix significant amounts of carbon in the soil and in the standing tree biomass 
(Fisher et al., 1994; Pfaff et al., 2000). Both biodiversity and carbon sequestration benefits are 
off-site, however, so land users will tend not to include them when they decide which practices 
to adopt. Silvopastoral practices can also affect water services, though the specific impact is 
likely to be site specific (Bruijnzeel, 2004). GEF funding for the Silvopastoral Project is based 
on the desire to secure these biodiversity and carbon sequestration benefits.  
Most PES programs focus on very few land uses. Costa Rica’s program, for example, 
pays for conserving existing forest and for establishing timber plantations (Pagiola, 2005).3 But 
pastures with low tree density provide fewer biodiversity and carbon benefits than pastures with 
higher tree density. Likewise, biodiversity benefits will be greater when a variety of native 
species with different canopy heights is used. To encourage adoption of more beneficial 
practices, the Silvopastoral Project offers payments that are proportional to the level of services 
provided. To do so, it developed indices of the biodiversity conservation and carbon 
sequestration services that different land uses provide, then aggregated them into a single 
‘environmental services index’ (ESI).4 The project distinguishes 28 different land uses,5 each 
with its own ESI score, and pays participants according to the change in total ESI score over 
their entire farm area.  
PES will have the desired effect only if they influence land use decisions appropriately. 
Silvopastoral practices tend to be unattractive to land users, despite their long-term benefits, 
primarily because of their substantial initial investment and because of the time lag between 
investment and returns. This leads to the hypothesis that a relatively small payment provided 
                                                 
3  An agoforestry contract has recently been added, based in part on the example of the Silvopastoral Project. 
4  The ESI is described in detail in CIPAV (2003) and Pagiola et al. (2004). 
5  Not all of these land uses are relevant for the Nicaragua site. 
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early on could ‘tip the balance’ between current and silvopastoral practice, by increasing the net 
present value of investments and reducing the initial period in which these practice impose net 
costs on land users.6 By the time payments end, the silvopastoral practices themselves will begin 
generating income for land users. The payments also alleviate the liquidity problems faced by 
many land users and help them finance the required investments. Based on this analysis, the 
project provides payments of US$75 per incremental ESI point, per year, over a four-year period. 
In addition, participants receive a one-time payment of US$10/point for the baseline points.  
The Silvopastoral Project offers a strong test of ability to participate, as many of the 
measures it supports are both expensive and technically challenging to implement. Table 1 shows 
the estimated investment costs of some of the practices concerned at the study site. Many of 
these practices are also technically complex. Choice of species and appropriate management can 
have a significant impact on their benefits. At the same time, however, the project also offers 
several easier and cheaper options. Should either investment requirements or technical capacity 
prove to be formidable obstacles for poorer households, there would be a clear division in the 
types of PES-supported activities they implement. 
4. Study site 
The Matiguás-Río Blanco area is located in the department of Matagalpa, about 140km 
from the capital of the country, Managua. It is located on the southern slopes of the Cordillera de 
Darien and has an undulating terrain, with an elevation of about 300-500m above sea level. 
Average temperature is about 25C and average rainfall between 1700mm and 2500mm. 
Participants are clustered in two adjacent microwatersheds, that of Río Bulbul and that of Río 
Paiwas.  
Land use in the watershed is dominated by extensive grazing.7 As shown in Table 2, 
pastures account for about 63% of the area. Of this, about half is degraded pasture, and a little 
over a quarter has either no or few trees. Annual crops make up a very small part of total area. It 
is noteworthy that some forest remains, accounting for about 20% of total area; most of this is 
riparian forest. It is also noteworthy that silvopastoral practices, though not common, were not 
unknown even before the project: there were some 550ha of pastures with high tree density, and 
88ha of fodder banks, for example. Farms range in size from 10-30ha to a few of over 60ha. 
Most households are poor, with many falling below Nicaragua’s extreme poverty line.  
                                                 
6  It is important to note, however, that payments in PES programs should generally be on-going rather than finite. 
The use of short-term payments in the Silvopastoral Project means that the conditionality of payments is limited 
to the first few years, which may well affect the Project’s long-term impact. Indeed, this limited conditionality 
has led some to question whether the Silvopastoral Project should be considered PES at all. Although there is at 
present no generally accepted definition of PES, all available formal definitions (Pagiola and Platais, 
forthcoming; Wunder, 2005) consider conditionality a key aspect of PES programs. We believe that the 
Silvopastoral Project can be considered a PES program in that it pays service providers based on their 
(expected) provision of environmental services, with funding provided by a representative of service users. 
Payments are not based on the cost of implementing land use changes (as in traditional subsidies to natural 
resource managements investments), but are proportional to expected service delivery and conditional on 
having undertaken activities expected to provide the desired services. Nevertheless, the Project’s limited 
conditionality may well affect the long-term viability of the mechanism at this site, as we discuss in more detail 
in a separate paper (Pagiola et al., in review). The use of short-term payments is not pertinent to the issue 
considered in this paper, which focuses on the extent of participation, and whether poverty affects it. 
7  In the discussion that follows, all figures refer only to the area managed by project participants. This area 
accounts for about 60% and 40% of total area in the Bulbul and Paiwas microwatersheds, respectively. 
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5. Data collection 
To examine participation decisions, we used three data sets. The first is the baseline 
survey conducted in October-November 2002, during project preparation. This survey included 
very detailed information on household characteristics. A second survey of participants was 
conducted in March-May 2004, after the first year of project implementation. This survey 
collected information on land use changes that occurred in the intervening period.8 Our analysis 
only includes participants with information in both surveys, giving us a total of 103 observations. 
Information from these two surveys was then complemented with detailed land use data for each 
farm, derived from maps prepared annually by the project for each farm using remote sensing 
imagery.9 These maps gave us more accurate and consistent measures of area than data from the 
surveys, and ensured that land uses were classified consistently into the project’s categories.  
Both the baseline and follow-up surveys included a control group, as does the mapping 
dataset. The main intended purpose of this group was to attempt to distinguish project-induced 
land use changes from changes induced by other factors, as recommended by Ferraro and 
Pattanayak (2006). Upon analysis, however, control group members were found to differ from 
participants in many important characteristics (such as income, farm size, or herd size). As 
project participants make up a large proportion of all households in the two microwatersheds in 
the project area (65% in Bulbul and 35% in Paiwas), non-participants had to be sought 
elsewhere. Unfortunately, they were poorly chosen. Because of these differences, we decided 
that using the control group would not be useful. Our analysis, therefore, focuses entirely on 
participants.  
As our interest is on the ability of poorer households to participate, measuring household 
income is critical. We computed household income by adding all income sources reported by 
participants, including net income from agricultural, forest, and dairy production; livestock sales; 
off-farm work; net income from non-farm enterprises; and remittances. Dairy, agricultural, and 
forest products consumed by the household are included in the calculation of income using 
market prices, and the value of family labor is imputed using local wage rates for unskilled labor. 
Expenditure is generally preferred over income as an indicator of household welfare, as it tends 
to be less variable (Ravallion, 1992). However, the baseline survey only collected data allowing 
income to be computed. Moreover, these data are based largely on information self-reported by 
the farmers, and so are subject to both recall problems and possible biases. As our primary 
interest is in assessing differences in participation within our sample, these biases are unlikely to 
affect our results as long they are similar across income groups. We used our estimates of 
household income per capita to classify households into three groups using the poverty lines 
given in the World Bank’s (2003) report on poverty in Nicaragua: those with incomes below the 
extreme poverty line (“extremely poor”), those with incomes between the extreme poverty line 
and the poverty line (“poor”), and those with incomes above the poverty line (“non-poor”).10  
                                                 
8  The questionnaires for both surveys are available from the authors on request. 
9  Quickbird imagery with a 61cm resolution was used, providing very high levels of detail. Land use maps for 
each farm derived from these images were then extensively ground-truthed to match each plot to one of the 28 
different land uses recognized by the project.  
10  The report classified individuals with income per capita in 2001 below C$5,160 as poor and individuals with 
income per capita below C$2,690 as extremely poor. Adjusting for inflation between 2001 and 2003 using the 
consumer price index given in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (2001 CPI= 1.00, 
10  
6. Participating households 
All households in the area that met minimal farm and herd size criteria were eligible to 
participate. Participants were selected on a first-come basis until the maximum number allowed 
by available funding was reached. The characteristics of participating households are 
summarized in Table 2. The average participating household has about 31ha of land and about 30 
head of livestock, of which a third are cows. The average household is composed of six 
members. The average per capita income of about C$4,700 is below the poverty line. Other 
indicators confirm the low living standards of the area’s households: few have water or 
electricity, and education levels are very low. Agriculture is the main economic activity, with 
few households having off-farm income. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of participating households according to their estimated 
household income per capita. As can be seen, most participating households are either poor 
(20%) or extremely poor (46%). Even those above the poverty line cannot be characterized as 
wealthy (hence our term “non-poor”).  
Breaking down participants into income groups shows both similarities and differences. 
Extremely poor households have significantly less land and smaller herds than poor households, 
which in turn have significantly less land and smaller herds than non-poor households. 
Extremely poor and poor households also have larger households and more dependents per adult. 
They are less likely to have either electricity or water. Particularly important for what follows, 
they are less likely to have access to credit and extremely poor households also are less likely to 
have year-round access by road. On the other hand, differences in educational level and 
experience are minimal and not statistically significant, as are the extent of off-farm 
employment. The proportion of farm area that is hilly is somewhat higher for poorer households, 
but the difference is not significant. Likewise, access to technical assistance appears to be 
slightly lower the poorer the household, but differences are not statistically significant. 
Although none of the participating households could be considered wealthy (even the 
best-off household has per capita income below US$10 a day), there are substantial differences 
within the group. Even US$10 a day would be riches to the 49% of households that have less 
than US$0.60 a person a day (the extreme poverty line). In particular, several variables that 
previous research has shown to have an important effect on participation, such as farm size, 
access to credit, and access to roads, differ significantly across income groups. Other important 
variable also vary across the group, though not necessarily in ways that are correlated with 
income. 
7. Changes in land use 
The Silvopastoral Project made its first payments, for baseline ESI points, in July 2003. It 
made its first payment for changes in land use in May 2004. Additional payments have since 
been made, in 2005 and 2006. Our analysis focuses on land change in the first year of the 
project.11
                                                                                                                                                             
2003 CPI=1.09), we obtain a poverty line for 2003 of C$5,640 and an extreme poverty line of C$2,940. In 
2003, US$1=C$14.25. 
11  Because payments under the Silvopastoral Project are for only four years, participants have an incentive to 
undertake as much of their planned land use changes as possible early.  
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Table 3 compares land use by participants prior to the project and after the first year of 
the project. Overall, there was substantial land use change: 545ha (over 17% of the total area) 
experienced some form of land use change. A wide variety of changes were observed, ranging 
from minor changes such as sowing improved grasses in degraded pastures to very substantial 
changes such as planting high-density tree stands or establishing fodder banks.12 The area of 
degraded pasture experienced the largest fall, being reduced by over half (467ha of the original 
869ha), and the area of annual crops also fell by almost a third (70ha of the original 232ha). 
Pastures with low tree density experienced a net increase of 228ha, and pastures with high tree 
density of 201ha (in addition, substantial areas of natural pastures with either low or high tree 
density were sown with improved grasses). There was also a substantial increase in the area 
devoted to fodder banks (66ha, almost doubling the original area). These changes are also 
illustrated in Figure 2. Overall, these changes increased the total ESI score of participants by 
25%. 
Figure 2 breaks down observed land use changes by household income group. Poor 
households and extremely poor households accounted for a substantial share of land use changes. 
They accounted for 51% of the decline in degraded pasture and 70% of the decline in area under 
annual crops. Moreover, land use changes by poorer households were not limited to adopting 
technically simpler and less onerous practices. Extremely poor households established 40ha of 
fodder banks (61% of the total), for example, and poor households another 11ha (17%), 
compared to only 14ha (22%) by non-poor households.13 Poor households were also responsible 
for the bulk of increase in pastures with high tree density (118ha, or 59%) with extremely poor 
households providing another 45ha (23%). Indeed, it was the non-poor who seemed to focus on 
the simpler practices: establishing natural pasture with low tree density was the most important 
single change these households made. 
Table 4 examines various indices of household participation across income groups. Non-
poor households converted just under 12ha each, on average, almost twice the average area 
converted by all poor households. Within the poor, however, there was a wide difference 
between poor and extremely poor households, with the former converting practically as large an 
area as the non-poor, and the latter considerably less. The differences shrink considerably in 
terms of proportion of farm area converted, arguably a better indicator of ability to participate 
than total area converted, as poorer households tend to have smaller farms. Although extremely 
poor households converted the smallest proportion of their farm of any of the groups, the 
difference was less marked. Poor households converted the greatest proportion of their farm. 
Poor and extremely poor households also increased their use of live fencing proportionally more 
than non-poor households. A similar pattern can be seen in the changes in ESI points: the 
increase is greatest in absolute terms for non-poor households, but higher in proportional terms 
for poor households, with extremely poor households trailing. Extremely poor households had 
                                                 
12  The lack of a proper control group prevents a comparison to land use changes elsewhere, but casual observation 
suggests that land use changes in nearby areas were substantially less extensive, in both area affected and 
degree of change. The figures quoted actually under-state the extent of change, as they show net changes. In 
addition, existing silvopastoral practices were often upgraded to more intensive practices (for example, 
increasing the density of trees in pastures). 
13  The popularity of fodder banks among poorer households may be due to the greater availability and lower 
opportunity cost of labor in such households. The cut-and-carry practices that such banks imply require 
substantial amounts of labor. 
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the highest initial ESI/ha, however, so they may have had less scope for substantial 
improvements. 
Table 5 shows how different groups financed the investments they made, according to 
their responses on the first-year participant survey. Some investments were undertaken entirely 
with family labor and so did not require financing. The most frequently mentioned source of 
funds was the sale of animals (61% of all households), followed by the project’s initial ‘baseline’ 
payment (53%). A fairly large proportion (41%) was able to finance investments from savings, 
and a surprisingly large fraction (32%) had access to credit from a local community bank. In 
general, there were almost no significant differences in the importance of different financing 
sources across income groups. Surprisingly, the poor had slightly better access to credit from 
private banks, but the overall importance of this financing source was minimal. 
8. Household participation decisions 
A simple examination of observed land use change indicates that poorer households are 
in fact able to participate quite extensively in this particular PES program, even though it 
requires some technically complex and onerous land use changes. To shed further light on 
participation decisions and the factors that may affect them, we undertook an econometric 
analysis of participation rates. 
The literature on adoption decisions usually looks at the binary choice of whether or not 
to adopt a given practice, using cross-sectional data on adopters and non-adopters, and the effect 
of different factors on the probability of adoption (Pattanayak et al., 2003). This approach is not 
relevant in our case, for two reasons. First, the pilot nature of the Silvopastoral Project means 
that the participation decision is not entirely up to farm households. Project funding limited the 
number of participants; many non-participants wanted to participate. Second, a binary 
adoption/non-adoption choice would fail to capture the nature of participation in the 
Silvopastoral Project. Rather than participation per se, what is of interest here is the intensity of 
participation. The formal question we want to pose, then, is how household characteristics affect 
the intensity of participation, with a particular focus on whether poorer households are less able 
to participate than better-off households. Our approach is similar to that of Nkonya et al. (1997), 
who examined the intensity of adoption of improved seed in Tanzania using continuous variables 
(hectares planted with improved maize seed or amount of fertilizer applied per hectare of maize), 
and of Rajasekharan and Veeraputhran (2002), who examine the share of farms using 
intercropping in Kerala, India. 
The dependent variable for our analysis can be formulated in many different ways. The 
simplest is the area converted: The greater the area converted, the higher the participation. 
Households with little land—including many poorer households—will clearly score poorly on 
this indicator, however. Using the proportion of farm area converted avoids this problem, but 
faces others. Converting 5ha of land to improved practices takes greater effort than converting 
1ha, yet if the first household has 10ha and the second only 1ha, the first household (50% 
converted) will appear to be participating ‘less’ than the second (100% conversion). However 
expressed, area-based indicators also fail to measure whether changes are large or small. Planting 
trees at a low density in a plot of degraded pasture requires substantially less effort than 
converting it to fodder banks, yet will have the same value in terms of either area converted or 
percent of farm area converted. Area-based indicators also omit investments in live fencing. One 
option to incorporate a measure of intensity is to weight the area converted by the ESI of the land 
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use change. The ESI is not intended as a measure of effort, but higher-ESI land uses tend to 
involve more effort than lower-ESI uses. This measure is also appealing as it is the outcome of 
interest to the ‘user’ of the environmental services being sought. This measure could also be 
stated in different ways. The increase in total ESI is the simplest measure (and is readily 
available, as it is the basis for payments to participants), but like the area converted is 
constrained by total farm size. Stating it in terms of increase in ESI per hectare or percent 
increase in ESI addresses this problem. As each of these alternatives has its advantages and 
disadvantages, we use them all in separate models. 
We thus ran five separate regressions, one with each dependent variable. Similar to 
Rajasekharan and Veeraputhran (2002)14, we employed a one-tailed Tobit to model farm area, as 
this variable is restricted to non-negative values. Likewise we employed a two-tailed Tobit 
model to model the percentage of the farm area converted, as this ranges between 0 and 100. 
Change in ESI, change in ESI per hectare, and percent change in ESI can take any value, and so 
are modeled using ordinary least squares (OLS).15
Our choice of explanatory variables draws on the factors identified by Pagiola et al. 
(2005) as likely to affect participation in PES, and by Pattanayak et al. (2003) and the studies 
they cite as likely to affect adoption of agroforestry practices, with modifications for the 
particularities of our case. Eligibility is not an issue here, as we focus on an area that was 
selected for inclusion in the project. The desire to participate per se is also not an issue, as we are 
only looking at households who have chosen to participate. However, as the Silvopastoral 
Project offers a wide range of participation options, variables that affect desire to participate 
remain relevant, as they may affect the desire to undertake more intensive practices. Our main 
concern, however, is on factors that may impede a household’s ability to participate. Within 
these factors, tenure is not an issue in Matiguás-Río Blanco, as the site was selected partly for the 
absence of such problems.  
The number of explanatory variables that could be included was limited by the relatively 
small sample size. In this case, increasing the sample was not an option: our data include every 
single project participant. Fortunately, the small size of the study site means that many potential 
explanatory variables vary little across households, and thus can be safely omitted.16
Many studies have shown that farm characteristics often have an important impact on 
adoption decisions. Most previous studies report a positive effect of farm size on adoption of 
various practices, which has been interpreted as indicating higher flexibility of the farming 
system or the existence of economies of scale (Rajasekharan and Veeraputhran, 2002; Thacher et 
al., 1997; Nowak, 1987). Labor availability would seem likely to be important, although it is not 
often significant (Pattanayak et al., 2003). We include a measure of the hours per week worked 
on the farm. We also include measures of the experience (the number of years managing the 
farm) and gender of the household head, to capture characteristics of the farmers themselves 
which have often been found to be important.  
                                                 
14  Rajasekharan and Veeraputhran (2002) employed a one-tailed Tobit to study the adoption of intercropping in 
three regions in Kerala, India using the share of farm area under intercropping as the dependent variable. 
15  In principle, percent change in ESI could not be less than -100%. In practice, however, this limit is not binding, 
as no household even approached it. Indeed, only two households had a negative change in ESI. 
16  We found no evidence of either moderate or strong muticollinerarity in any of the regression models using the 
Belsley et al. (1980) diagnostics in OLS models and the Belsley (1991) diagnostic in the Tobit models. 
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As our study area is small, most farms face similar prices for inputs and outputs, and have 
similar yield potentials. The profitability of the various silvopastoral practices should thus be 
broadly similar throughout the area. Two factors which do differ across farms may affect the 
profitability of the practices. Farmers with lower accessibility will tend to face higher input costs 
and lower output prices at the farm gate. We include a binary variable indicating whether a 
household has year-round access by road, and expect a positive association with participation. 
Topography could also affect the profitability of different measures, although the direction of the 
impact is less clear. Land on steep slopes may benefit more from silvopastoral practices in that it 
is more vulnerable to degradation under traditional extensive grazing. On the other hand, the cost 
of implementing practices may be higher. We include a variable on the percentage of farm area 
with hilly topography, without making any prediction as to how it will affect results.  
To examine whether initial investment costs affect ability to participate, we include 
variables on access to credit and off-farm income. Both have often been found to be significant. 
Access to credit is included as a binary indicator of whether a household had access to credit 
during the five years prior to project implementation.17 It is expected to be positively related 
with participation. Off-farm income is measured as the income share of off-farm jobs held by all 
household members. It can be a financing source for investment in new practices, but can also 
result in a higher opportunity cost of labor.  
Technical complexity of adoption of many practices may be overcome with training in 
their implementation. Indeed, the Silvopastoral Project provided such technical assistance to a 
(randomly-selected) subset of participants. We include a binary indicator for whether households 
received such support from the Project.  
As poverty is multidimensional, we also include dummies for whether households are 
poor (with separate dummies for poor and extremely poor households), to capture other aspects 
of poverty that may not be captured by the previous variables. 
Table 6 summarizes the results of the analysis.18 The first two columns report the results 
of Tobit models for area changed and proportion of farm changed, and the last three columns the 
results for the OLS models for change in ESI, percentage change in ESI, and change in ESI per 
hectare. Measures of model fit are relatively low, but this is not surprising with cross-sectional 
data, particularly when sample sizes are small. They are comparable to those obtained by 
Rajasekharan and Veeraputhran (2002) and Ervin and Ervin (1982).   
Although relatively few explanatory variables are significant, most estimated coefficients 
have the expected sign, and are largely consistent with the results of other studies. As expected, 
farm area is positively associated with intensity. This effect is strongest in the models using 
                                                 
17  The endogeneity of credit was tested using the Wu-Hausman and Hausman tests in the OLS models and the 
Smith-Blundell test in the Tobit models. Exogeneity of credit was not rejected in any model at the 90% 
confidence level. 
18  OLS models were tested for heteroscedasticity in the error distribution using the Breusch-Pagan test. Results for 
these tests rejected the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity of errors, which if ignored would result in the lost of 
optimality of the OLS estimator (Greene, 2000; Mittelhammer et al., 2000). In the absence of prior information 
about the structure of the heteroscedasticity, we used the OLS estimator with White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent covariance matrix estimator (White, 1980). We found no evidence of either moderate or strong 
muticollinerarity in any of the regression models using the Belsley et al. (1980) diagnostics in OLS models and 
the Belsley (1991) diagnostic in the Tobit models. 
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absolute measures of area adopted or ESI increases, and only significant in those cases. This is 
not surprising: the larger the farm, the harder it will be to convert a large share of it, offsetting 
the flexibility and economies of scale that size might provide. Family labor is not significant. 
Experience shows either a very small or a negative effect on intensity of participation, and is 
significant in two cases. Other studies have often usually found a positive effect, though rarely a 
significant one and have generally attributed it to experience reducing the risk of adoption 
(Pattanayak et al., 2003); perhaps the negative effect we find is due to older farmers being less 
willing to make changes.19 Male-headed households have greater intensity of participation under 
all measures, but this effect is only significant in one case.  
Among the factors that can affect the profitability of adoption, and hence household’s 
desire to do so, accessibility by road has the expected positive sign, and is significant in several 
of the models. The proportion of the farm on hilly terrain has a negative impact, but it is not 
significant. As noted above, there is no strong a priori reason to expect a particular sign on this 
variable. Among the factors that affect the ability of households to participate in the program, 
access to credit also has the expected positive sign. It is interesting that it is not significant in 
explaining area converted but is significant in explaining increases in ESI, which requires greater 
effort and cost. Access to technical assistance, on the other hand, has very inconclusive and non-
significant results. As shown in Table 2, none of the silvopastoral practices promoted by the 
project were unknown in the region. Even the more complex practices, such as fodder banks, 
were already in use, albeit on a small scale. Almost half of farm households had already 
established fodder banks, for example. That technical assistance should not be significant is thus 
not very surprising; many households already knew how to implement them, and the others 
could probably learn from their neighbors if they did not have access to technical assistance.20
Finally, the poverty dummies show some interesting patterns. Poor (but not extremely 
poor) households have consistently higher intensity of participation than all other groups, and 
this effect is significant in several models. Conversely, extremely poor households have a lower 
intensity of participation (except in one model), though this effect is not significant in any model. 
These results are consistent with those shown in Table 4: the group of poor households generally 
has higher intensity of participation than either extremely poor or non-poor households, even 
after accounting for a variety of factors. Explaining this result will require further analysis; one 
hypothesis is that poor households have fewer constraints to participation than extremely poor 
households, but greater desire to participate than relatively better-off households, who may have 
better off-farm opportunities. Our results are line with those of Bandiera (2004), who found that 
farmer wealth was not a significant determinant of tree cultivation in Nicaragua. 
9. Conclusions 
Can poorer households participate in PES programs? The experience of the Silvopastoral 
Project in Matiguás-Río Blanco indicates that they can. Not only did poorer households 
participate quite extensively, but by some measures they participated to a greater extent than 
better-off households. Nor was their participation limited to the simpler, least expensive options: 
                                                 
19  Age and education variables gave very similar results to experience. 
20  Note that this result only speaks to the impact of technical assistance on the intensity of adoption. Access to 
technical assistance might have other impacts, however. For example, it might result in more effective 
implementation of adopted practices, thus increasing their profitability. 
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poorer households tended to implement more substantial changes in land use. Extremely poor 
households do appear to have had somewhat greater difficulty in participating, but even in their 
case the difference is solely a relative one. Extremely poor households not only were not shut 
out, but participated at high rates in the project. And again their participation was not limited 
solely to the simpler and cheaper practices. These results are particularly strong in that the 
Silvopastoral Project imposes much greater burdens on participants than most PES programs.  
This conclusion obviously needs to be approached with some caution. It is possible that 
the high levels of participation by poorer households are due to self-selection bias: only those 
households able to participate may have joined. We believe this is unlikely, for two reasons. 
First, the project offered a very wide range of participation options, including many that are not 
very onerous, even for poorer households. Indeed, households could in principle have done 
absolutely nothing; they would then have received the baseline payment but would not have 
received any payment beyond that. In fact, no household chose that route. Second, as noted 
previously, a large proportion of all households in the two microwatersheds actually participated, 
and many of the others wanted to participate as well, but were prevented from doing so by the 
project’s own limits on the number it could accept. But even if there were some self-selection at 
play, it is significant that in a poor area such as Matiguás-Río Blanco there are many poor 
households—including many extremely poor households—that are able to participate in a PES 
program, and even to undertake expensive and technically challenging land use practices.  
Nevertheless, one should not jump to the sanguine conclusion that all poor farm 
households everywhere will always be able to participate in PES programs.21 Both PES 
programs and local conditions differ from case to case, and there may well be cases where 
otherwise eligible poor households may find it difficult or impossible to participate. Indeed, 
results in Matiguás-Río Blanco show that extremely poor households do appear to have had 
greater difficulty in participating as intensively as other households. 
Our detailed results help us identify several specific factors that tend to affect 
participation. This information can help design PES programs to reduce potential obstacles to the 
participation of poorer households. There is little that a PES program can do about poorer farms 
being less accessible, but it can do something about financing constraints and technical 
difficulty.  
The significance of credit underlines an important potential constraint for poorer 
households. This constraint will not always be present in PES programs. When PES programs 
require maintaining existing practices—as in the majority of contracts in Costa Rica’s program, 
for example—there are no investment requirements. Financing constraints may be important 
when land use changes are required for participation, however, as in Costa Rica’s Reforestation 
or Agroforestry contracts. Our results suggest that this constraint is not absolute, as it is 
sometimes made out to be. Even poor households such as those in Matiguás-Río Blanco often 
have a variety of ways to finance profitable investments, as Table 5 demonstrates. Nevertheless, 
it is likely that poorer households will have fewer such alternatives: fewer savings, fewer assets 
that might be sold, worse access to credit. Providing some initial financing (such as the baseline 
                                                 
21  It is also important to recall that this case study does not speak to possible differences in eligibility to 
participate, due to spatial considerations or tenure problems. Pagiola and Colom (2006) find that the areas in 
Guatemala that are important for the provision of water services do not always have high poverty rates. 
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payment made by the Silvopastoral Project) may be desirable for PES programs that involve 
initial investments in areas with many poor households.22
The need for technical assistance is far less clear from our results. Again, this need is 
only likely to arise when PES programs require participants to undertake land use changes, and 
even then only if these are complex or little known. In the case of Matiguás-Río Blanco, the 
practices being promoted by the PES program were relatively complex, but were also relatively 
well known in the area.  
The availability of multiple options in the Silvopastoral Project may well have 
contributed to high participation by the poor, as they were able to choose the options that work 
best for them, in light of their particular constraints. When there are multiple ways of providing a 
service (or different levels of a service), it makes sense to offer multiple ways in which 
households can participate, as long as transaction costs do not increase unduly. It is interesting to 
note, however, that at Matiguás-Río Blanco the poorer households did not choose the cheaper 
and easier land uses – in fact, it was the better off households that did so. 
In general, transaction costs are likely to be a bigger threat to the participation of poorer 
households in PES programs then their own ability to participate (Pagiola et al., 2005). Our 
results illustrate this. Consider Table 4. All poor households converted almost 25% of their 
farms, on average, and increased their ESI score by about 25%. These participation rates 
compare favorably with those of non-poor households, who converted 26% of their farms and 
increased their ESI score by 24%. But from the perspective of the service buyer, what matters is 
the absolute increase in environmental service generation (whether proxied by area, as is 
commonly the case, or by more sophisticated measures such as the ESI), and the unit cost of 
achieving it. The cost, in turn, has two components: the cost of the payment, which is identical 
for a given increase in ESI for all households, and the transaction cost of contracting with each 
household. This second cost is likely to be largely fixed per household, irrespective of farm size. 
Thus non-poor households converted a total of 374ha and achieved a total increase in ESI of 222 
points. At first glance, poorer households did better: they converted 450ha and increased ESI by 
349 points. On a per contract basis, however, the comparison is less favorable: non-poor 
households converted 11.7ha and increased ESI by 6.9 points per contract, while all poor 
households converted 6.3ha and increased ESI by 4.9 points per contract. If poor households are 
distinguished from extremely poor households, the contrast is even starker: extremely poor 
households only converted 4.2ha and increased ESI by 3.2 points per contract. The larger the 
transaction costs, the more attractive it will be for PES programs to focus on large land holdings. 
As farm size tends to be highly correlated with income, in practice this will mean focusing on 
better-off households. This is not a purely hypothetical concern: In Ecuador, the PROFAFOR 
program has decided to adopt a 50ha minimum size for the forest plantations from which it buys 
carbon sequestration services (Alban and Wunder, 2005).  
Keeping transaction costs low—in addition to being desirable in itself—is thus 
imperative if poorer households are not be shut out of many PES programs.23 But the smaller 
                                                 
22  Costa Rica frontloads payments under its timber plantation contract for this reason. Frontloaded payments, 
however, introduce other problems, as they reduce the conditionality of the program. 
23  The Silvopastoral Project as presently conducted is a poor example of this, as it has relatively high monitoring 
costs dictated in part by its pilot nature and in part by the need to distinguish small differences in land use so as 
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farm size of many poor households means they will always have relatively higher transactions 
costs. It is thus important to attempt to devise mechanisms to overcome them. Costa Rica, for 
example, experimented with collective contracting, under which groups of small farmers joined 
the country’s PES program collectively rather than individually, thus spreading transaction costs 
over a large group. This approach ran into problems, however, as non-compliance by a single 
group member resulted in payments being halted to all members. The approach has thus been 
revised to process the applications of such groups together, but then issue individual contracts; 
this avoids the partial compliance problem, but has much smaller savings in transaction costs 
(Pagiola, 2005). This is clearly an area in which more work—and some imaginative solutions—
will be necessary. This is also an area in which development aid could be used to leverage PES 
programs by providing support to the participation of poorer households, and in particular by 
underwriting some of the transaction costs involved. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
to compute ESI scores. Work is underway under the project to determine the nature of the tradeoff between 
monitoring costs and effectiveness.  
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Table 1: Establishment costs for selected silvopastoral practices, Matiguás-Río Blanco, 
Nicaragua 
(US$/ha unless otherwise indicated) 
Improved pasture without trees 180 
Improved pasture with low tree density (< 30 trees/ha) 340 
Improved pasture with high tree density (>30 trees/ha) 390 
Gramineous fodder bank 250-270 
Fodder bank with woody species 170-270 
Live fence (US$/km) 110-160 
‘Dead’ fence (US$/km) 970 
Notes: Costs shown are based on switching from degraded pasture; actual costs will vary if the initial 
land use is different. 
Source: Silvopastoral project data. 
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Table 2: Characteristics of participating households, Matiguás-Río Blanco, Nicaragua 
Variable 
Extremely 
poor Poor 
Non-
poor All 
Farm area (ha) 21.8*,† 35.0* 41.0† 30.7 
Cattle (number of heads) 20† 26‡ 49†,‡ 30 
Cows (number of heads) 8† 10‡ 18†,‡ 11 
Year-round access by road (%) 82.00† 85.71 96.88† 87.38 
Access by paved road (%) 8.00 14.29 21.88 13.59 
Hilly topography (% of farm area) 15.24 13.57 24.47 17.77 
Water (% with water service) 22.00† 19.05‡ 40.63†,‡ 27.18 
Electricity (% with electric service) 2.00† 4.76 18.75† 7.77 
Household size (number of members) 7*,† 6*,‡ 5†,‡ 6 
Family labor (hrs/week/ha) 5.57*,† 2.93* 3.00† 4.23 
Dependency ratio (number of non-adults/ number of adults) 0.90† 0.69 0.55† 0.75 
Male headed household (%) 88.00 95.24 96.88 92.23 
Education of household head (years) 2.30 3.67 3.47 2.94 
Experience (years) 10.13 13.33 12.69 11.58 
Principal occupation of household head is farming (%) 82.00 90.48 87.50 85.44 
Off-farm work (% with off-farm employment) 20.00 23.81 9.38 17.48 
Off-farm income (% of total income) 5.53 6.09 4.08 5.19 
Non-farm enterprise (% with non-farm enterprise) 16.00 9.52 25.00 17.48 
Technical assistance (% with technical assistance) 64.00 76.19 68.75 67.96 
Credit (% with access to credit) 44.00† 42.86‡ 68.75†,‡ 51.46 
Assets (‘000 C$) 6.49 15.23 2.95 7.17 
Net income per capita (C$) -2,446*,† 4,109*,‡ 16,173†,‡ 4,675 
Number of observations 50 21 32 103 
Notes: *,†,‡ indicate means are significantly different in paired t-test at 10% test level.  
In 2003 $1US=14.25 C$. An adult is defined as an individual >12 years.  
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Table 3: Land use among Silvopastoral Project participants, Matiguás-Río Blanco, 
Nicaragua 
(ha, unless otherwise noted) 
 
Before project  
First year of 
project 
Land use 
Environmental 
services index 
(points/ha) (ha) (%)  (ha) (%) 
0. Infrastructure, housing, and roads 0.0 5.5  0.2   5.5  0.2  
1. Annual crops 0.0 231.5  7.4   161.0  5.1  
2. Degraded pasture 0.0 868.9  27.7   401.5  12.8  
3. Natural pasture without trees 0.2 65.0  2.1   84.5  2.7  
4. Improved pasture without trees 0.5 22.4  0.7   38.3  1.2  
5. Semi-permanent crops 0.5 33.0  1.1   27.4  0.9  
6. Natural pasture with low tree density  0.6 333.7  10.6   448.0  14.3  
11/13/17/25. Fodder banka 0.8 88.3  2.8   154.1  4.9  
12. Improved pasture with low tree 
density 0.9 137.3  4.4   250.7  8.0  
7/14. Natural pasture with high tree 
densityb 1.0 381.8  12.2   471.3  15.0  
10/15/19. Diversified fruit cropsa 1.1 21.1  0.7   20.1  0.6  
18/22. Monoculture timber plantation 1.2 1.1  0.0   2.1  0.1  
9/20. Improved pasture with high tree 
densityb 1.3 167.0  5.3   278.8  8.9  
23. Scrub habitats (tacotales) 1.4 154.9  4.9   157.5  5.0  
24/26/27/28. Secondary and riparian 
foresta 1.7 627.9  20.0   638.6  20.3  
Total area  3,139.4  100.0   3,139.4  100.0  
8/16. Live fence (km) 1.1 128.5    239.0   
Notes: Totals may not add up because of rounding 
Land uses recognized by the project but not found at this site are omitted.  
a Similar land uses with small areas have been aggregated; ESI shown is for use with largest area. 
b The project distinguishes land uses with recently planted trees from the same land uses with mature 
trees for the purpose of computing the ESI score; here these land uses have been aggregated to their 
mature state, and the corresponding ESI score is shown. 
Sources: ESI score from Silvopastoral Project manual (CIPAV, 2003); land use from Silvopastoral Project, based 
on analysis of remote sensing imagery verified in the field 
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Table 4: Participation rates by income group, Matiguás-Río Blanco, Nicaragua 
Live fencing Environmental services index Total 
land 
Change in 
land use Increase  (total points)  (points/ha) 
Income group (ha)  (ha) (%) 
Initial
(km) (km) (%) Initial Increase  Initial Increase
Change
(%) 
Per household:              
All poor 25.7  6.3 24.7 1.1 1.0 91.3 19.7 4.9  0.77 0.19 24.9 
Extremely poor 21.8  4.2 19.2 1.0 0.8 83.2 18.0 3.2  0.82 0.14 17.5 
Poor 35.0  11.5 32.8 1.4 1.4 105.5 23.8 9.1  0.68 0.26 38.1 
All non-poor 41.0  11.7 28.4 1.6 1.2 77.7 29.4 6.9  0.72 0.17 23.6 
All 30.5   8.0 26.2  1.2 1.1 85.9  22.7 5.5   0.75 0.18 24.4 
Total area:         
All poor 1,826.4  450.4 24.7 77.7 70.9 91.3 1,400.2 348.5  0.77 0.19 24.9 
Extremely poor 1,092.0  209.5 19.2 49.3 41.0 83.2 900.1 157.9  0.82 0.14 17.5 
Poor 734.4  240.8 32.8 28.4 29.9 105.5 500.1 190.6  0.68 0.26 38.1 
All non-poor 1,313.5  373.6 28.4 50.9 39.5 77.7 941.7 222.1  0.72 0.17 23.6 
All 3,139.9   823.9 26.2  128.5 110.4 85.9  2,341.8 570.6   0.75 0.18 24.4 
Sources: Computed from Silvopastoral Project mapping data. 
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Table 5: Financing sources for investments in silvopastoral practices, by income group, 
Matiguás-Río Blanco, Nicaragua 
(% of households citing source as among two most important sources) 
 Extremely 
poor Poor All poor 
Non-
poor All 
No cash needed – used family labor 46.0 38.1 43.7 46.9 44.7 
Savings 44.0 33.3 40.8 40.6 40.8 
Borrowed money      
? Private bank 2.0 9.5 4.2* 0.0* 2.9 
? Rural bank/community bank 28.0 28.6 28.2 40.6 32.0 
? Other sources 4.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 1.9 
Others 8.0 4.8 7.0 3.1 5.8 
NGO projects 0.0 4.8 1.4 3.1 1.9 
Sold assets      
? Animals 60.0 61.9 60.6 62.5 61.2 
? Land 0.0 9.5 2.8 0.0 1.9 
? Equipment 2.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.0 
? Other 2.0 4.8 2.8 0.0 1.9 
Traded services for service 6.0 14.3 8.5 12.5 9.7 
Payment from Silvopastoral project 50.0 52.4 50.7 59.4 53.4 
Remittances from family members abroad 2.0 9.5 4.2 3.1 3.9 
Income from off-farm activities 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 1.9 
Notes: Percentages do not add to 100 because of multiple responses. 
* indicates means are significantly different in paired t-test at 10% test level. 
Sources: Computed from data in 1st year participant survey. 
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Table 6: Estimation results     
Dependent variable: 
Area 
changed 
(ha) 
Proportion 
of farm 
changed 
(%) 
Change 
in ESI 
(points) 
% change 
in ESI 
Change 
in ESI 
per ha 
Independent Variable Model: Tobit Tobit OLS OLS OLS 
Constant -4.321  
(3.726) 
4.859  
(10.182) 
-5.094*  
(2.761) 
-0.268  
(18.756) 
-0.023 
(0.068) 
Farm area (ha) 0.264**  
(0.030) 
0.059  
(0.081) 
0.206**  
(0.041) 
0.026  
(0.156) 
0.001  
(0.001) 
Family labor (hrs/week/ha) 0.068  
(0.180) 
0.249  
(0.492) 
0.078  
(0.108) 
-0.162  
(0.893) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
Experience (years) 0.040  
(0.077) 
-0.1328 
(0.211) 
-0.061 
(0.061) 
-1.170**  
(0.555) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
Gender (1=male; 0=female) 2.674  
(2.456) 
7.116  
(6.715) 
1.656  
(1.765) 
10.998  
(8.463) 
0.075** 
(0.036) 
Year-round access by road (1=yes; 0=no) 1.226  
(2.073) 
9.618*  
(5.658) 
1.741  
(1.397) 
25.503**  
(10.750) 
0.105** 
(0.0449) 
Hilly topography (% of farm area) -0.022  
(0.023) 
-0.052  
(0.063) 
-0.030  
(0.018) 
-0.124  
(0.125) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Access to credit (1=yes; 0=no) 1.316  
(1.343) 
4.945  
(3.671) 
2.249* 
(1.179) 
13.945  
(9.663) 
0.054* 
(0.032) 
Income share of off-farm jobs 3.574  
(3.219) 
12.663 
(8.800) 
5.709  
(4.202) 
21.77  
(16.973) 
0.122* 
(0.068) 
Access to technical assistance (1=yes; 0=no) 0.191  
(1.367) 
0.852  
(3.737) 
-0.292  
(0.859) 
2.359  
(7.430) 
-0.013 
(0.026) 
Poor (1=poor; 0=otherwise) 1.579  
(1.856) 
9.160*  
(5.075) 
3.807*  
(2.210) 
24.051  
(17.878) 
0.116** 
(0.052) 
Extremely poor (1= extremely poor; 0=otherwise) -2.256  
(1.626) 
-3.102  
(4.445) 
0.298  
(1.167) 
-0.281  
(13.485) 
0.028  
(0.035) 
      
Adjusted R2   0.46 0.02 0.10 
Pseudo R2 0.57 0.15    
Number of observations 103 103 103 103 103 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; robust standard errors for OLS coefficients. 
*, ** indicates coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero at 90% or 95% confidence level. 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of reported annual household per capita income among Silvopastoral Project participants, Matiguás-
Río Blanco, Nicaragua 
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Source: Authors’ computations from Silvopastoral Project baseline survey. 
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Figure 2: Land use change in first year of Silvopastoral Project, by income group, Matiguás-Río Blanco, Nicaragua 
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Source: Authors’ computations from Silvopastoral Project mapping data. 
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